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Objective: This study tests the reliability of a system 
(FINANS) to collect and analyze incident reports in the 
financial trading domain and is guided by a human factors 
taxonomy used to describe error in the trading domain.
Background: Research indicates the utility of 
applying human factors theory to understand error in 
finance, yet empirical research is lacking. We report on 
the development of the first system for capturing and 
analyzing human factors–related issues in operational 
trading incidents.
Method: In the first study, 20 incidents are analyzed 
by an expert user group against a referent standard to 
establish the reliability of FINANS. In the second study, 
750 incidents are analyzed using distribution, mean, 
pathway, and associative analysis to describe the data.
Results: Kappa scores indicate that categories 
within FINANS can be reliably used to identify and 
extract data on human factors–related problems under-
lying trading incidents. Approximately 1% of trades 
(n = 750) lead to an incident. Slip/lapse (61%), situation 
awareness (51%), and teamwork (40%) were found to 
be the most common problems underlying incidents. 
For the most serious incidents, problems in situation 
awareness and teamwork were most common.
Conclusion: We show that (a) experts in the trad-
ing domain can reliably and accurately code human 
factors in incidents, (b) 1% of trades incur error, and 
(c) poor teamwork skills and situation awareness 
underpin the most critical incidents.
Application: This research provides data crucial 
for ameliorating risk within financial trading organiza-
tions, with implications for regulation and policy.
Keywords: financial trading, human error, system 
design, risk, teamwork, situation awareness
IntroductIon
Financial trading organizations buy and sell 
products (e.g., equities, physical commodities, 
financial options) in order to generate profit and 
optimize their portfolios. Large-scale failures 
(e.g., Société Général, UBS, JPMorgan) have 
resulted in multibillion-dollar fines from regula-
tors and have undermined the global economy. 
Investigations into their causes have highlighted 
problems in organizational culture (e.g., risk 
taking) and “rogue traders” who manipulate 
rules and systems. Increasingly, however, the 
role of human factors–related issues in manag-
ing risk within financial trading are also con-
sidered, with parallels being drawn between the 
financial trading industry and other “high-risk” 
industries (Young, 2011). For example, investi-
gations of trader performance have highlighted 
the importance of nontechnical skills (cognitive 
and social skills that underpin performance), 
human error (e.g., attention), and human–com-
puter interfaces for influencing performance in 
financial trading (Ashby, Palermo, & Power, 
2012; Fenton-O’Creevy, Nicholson, Soane, & 
Willman, 2003; Leaver & Reader, 2015; Will-
man, Fenton-O’Creevy, Nicholson, & Soane, 
2002). This outcome is similar to many other 
high-risk sectors (e.g., nuclear power, aviation, 
health care), yet relatively little is known about 
the link between human factors–related prob-
lems and incidents in trading (e.g., how many 
incidents occur and the causes of them).
In this article, we report on the development 
and application of the Financial Incident Analy-
sis System (FINANS). This is the first system 
developed to (a) collect voluntary operational 
trading incident reports (where trading activity 
results in an avoidable financial loss, for exam-
ple, due to poor decision making or a compli-
ance breach: Zhao & Olivera, 2006) from 
employees working on financial trading floors 
and (b) analyze incidents in order to identify the 
human factors issues reported within them. In 
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this study, we test the reliability of FINANS and 
apply it to examine the nature and prevalence of 
incidents caused by human factors–related prob-
lems in a trading organization.
Human Factors and Financial trading
Financial trading is an inherently complex 
and risky domain. Traders make high-stakes 
decisions within complex, large, noisy, high-
pressured, and technologically advanced envi-
ronments. They aim to generate profit for the 
organization and its stakeholders, and to do so, 
they must monitor market information (e.g., 
through screens), interact virtually and physi-
cally with other traders and stakeholders, make 
rapid investment decisions, and ensure that 
rules and procedures are followed (e.g., trading 
limits). Effective traders have good technical 
and nontechnical skills; however, the complex-
ity and pressure of trading lead to error and risk 
taking (Leaver & Reader, 2015). This combi-
nation can result in “operational incidents,” 
whereby trading activity results in an avoidable 
financial loss (e.g., making a trade without 
assessing market-related risk) or compliance 
failures (e.g., breach of trading limits), which 
place the integrity of the financial organiza-
tion at risk even if no loss has occurred (e.g., 
overexposure to volatile markets; Zhao & Oli-
vera, 2006). Crucially, such events are typically 
caused not by rogue traders (employees mak-
ing unapproved financial transactions) but by 
systemic problems across an organization (e.g., 
failure of the system to generate breach reports, 
inaccurate reporting on risk) that impair human 
performance (Leaver & Reader, 2015).
Thus, financial trading is increasingly con-
ceptualized as similar to a high-risk industry 
(Sutcliffe, 2011; Young, 2011), with risk con-
stantly being monitored and, when possible, 
reduced. However, unlike many high-risk indus-
tries, the success of financial trading organiza-
tions hinges on overt risk taking by traders (as it 
leads to a competitive advantage). This feature 
of the domain is consistent with Amalberti’s 
(2013) description of an “ultra-resilient” organi-
zation, where rather than engineering risk out of 
a system (e.g., through automation), risk is man-
aged through improving employee skills and 
system design. Typically, this improvement is 
achieved through gathering data on mishaps and 
examining the role of human performance and 
system design in those incidents. Yet, to date, no 
system exists for capturing operational incidents 
in financial trading and analyzing the human 
factors–related issues that contribute to them 
(Leaver & Reader, 2015). To address this gap in 
the literature, we report on the development and 
application of the first tool for capturing and 
analyzing human factors–related operational 
incidents within financial trading: FINANS.
Using incident reports to investigate human 
factors in financial trading. Investigations into 
how human factors–related issues influence the 
management of risk within complex industries 
often begin with the examination of incidents 
(e.g., mishaps, near misses) and their causes 
(Barach & Small, 2000), because such analyses 
are useful for understanding recurrent and sys-
temic problems in risk management. Incident-
reporting systems can lead to insight on the 
number and types of incidents occurring within 
an organization, their consequences, and the 
complex network of issues (e.g., errors, skill 
gaps, resources) that underpin them. Incidents 
are often collected through incident-reporting 
systems, whereby employees submit a narrative 
text and/or structured report on incidents they 
observed or participated in. Reports describe the 
types of events that took place (e.g., mechanical, 
procedural), the personnel involved (e.g., identi-
fying the teams), the activities leading to the 
incident (e.g., behaviors), and how the event was 
detected (e.g., system, observation). Incident 
reports can be anonymous or identified, can tri-
angulate with existing monitoring systems (e.g., 
instrument data), or can be the primary source of 
data on mishaps (e.g., in health care). Crucially, 
to be effective, incident monitoring systems rely 
on good procedures for capturing incidents (e.g., 
independent, with nonpunitive results), high-
quality data (e.g., freeform narratives that pro-
vide an ecological explanation of the event), 
strong analysis (through coding frameworks that 
identify causal factors), and robust feedback and 
learning mechanisms (e.g., for developing inter-
ventions, organizational learning) (Mahajan, 
2010).
Incident-reporting systems have been used 
extensively to identify and understand safety 
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problems in a number of high-risk industries. 
For example, the Aviation Safety Reporting 
System (ASRS; developed by the Federal Avia-
tion Administration and National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration [NASA]) is a volun-
tary and confidential incident-reporting system 
used by pilots and engineers (via a Web-based 
platform) to report near misses and incidents 
(Billings, 1998; Helmreich, 2000). These data 
are used to understand the role of employees 
and systems in detecting and coping with inci-
dents and to identify systemic and growing 
threats to safety. In other industries, for exam-
ple, health care, incident-reporting systems 
have also become relatively commonplace 
although are generally not as developed as in 
aviation (Itoh, Omata, & Anderson, 2009; Wu, 
Provonost, & Morlock, 2002). For example, in 
health care, staff often experience cultural barri-
ers in reporting incidents, and poor attitudes on 
incident reporting can limit institutional learn-
ing (Anderson, Kodate, Walters, & Dodds, 
2013; Waring, 2005). Furthermore, in aviation, 
incident-reporting methodology has continu-
ously evolved, for example, through the pres-
ence of a “callback” function that serves to 
gather additional information by interview prior 
to anonymization (NASA, 1999).
To understand and learn from incident reports, 
people tend to analyze them using reliable and 
theoretically derived taxonomies that classify 
the types of problems (e.g., error, skills, and sys-
tems) that contributed to an incident (Baker & 
Kronos, 2007; Barach & Small, 2000; Olsen, 
2011; Vincent & Amalberti, 2016, Chapter 5). 
Such taxonomies should be tailored to the indus-
try and should utilize human factors concepts to 
codify data on the types of incident experienced 
by operators (e.g., their technical nature, their 
outcomes), the workplace problems that lead to 
them (e.g., human–computer interfaces), and the 
skills and behaviors important for a work domain 
(e.g., in team vs. noncollaborative roles). The 
data collected can be used to collect headline 
data on incident occurrences within a given 
industry—for example, that in surgery, 43% of 
incidents involve team communication prob-
lems (Gawande, Zinner, Studdert, & Brennan, 
2003) or that in military aviation, errors are 
more likely in rotary than in fixed-wing aircraft 
(Hooper & O’Hare, 2013). Furthermore, inci-
dent reporting is used to identify in-depth data 
on the causes of specific forms of mishap that 
can be used to develop interventions (e.g., new 
software, training), or for example, aspects of 
system design that lead to errors in the flight 
cockpit (Billings, 1999; Moura, Beer, Patelli, 
Lewis, & Knoll, 2016) or aspects of clinician 
behavior that either contributed to an adverse 
event (e.g., loss of situation awareness) or helped 
to avert it (e.g., teamwork skills; Schulz, 
Endlsey, Kochs, Gelb, & Wagner, 2013; Undre, 
Sevdalis, Healey, Darzi, & Vincent, 2007).
In summary, the incident-reporting literature 
highlights a number of principles for how inci-
dents should be collected, analyzed, and used to 
influence safety-related practices. We apply 
these principles to develop a system for investi-
gating operational incidents in financial trading.
FInAnS
In the current study, we report on FINANS, 
which was designed to achieve three principle 
goals: first, to provide a standardized method 
for collecting data on operational incidents that 
occur on the trading floor; second, to develop 
a reliable method for analyzing and extracting 
human factors–related contributors to opera-
tional incidents; and third, to provide practical 
insight into how these contributors might be 
ameliorated. In the scope of this paper, we con-
sider human factors as aspects of human per-
formance and system design that contribute to 
problems in managing risk in financial trading.
FINANS comprises two parts. The first part 
is an “incident log” for capturing operational 
incidents on the trading floor. To recap, an inci-
dent in this context is an event that did lead or 
could have led to losses or unwanted market or 
credit exposure. Incidents can be wide ranging 
and can include technical systems failure (e.g., 
pricing tool failures), erroneous human input 
errors, misunderstandings of instructions or 
strategy between departments (e.g., between a 
trader and his or her risk department), and rule 
violations (e.g., late trade entry). Drawing on 
previous research, we use a Web-based design 
(Macrae, 2007; Mahajan, 2010; Wu et al., 2002). 
The system is accessed online, with reports 
being voluntary and anonymous (unless trading 
 at London School of Economics & Political Sciences on August 30, 2016hfs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Human Factors in Financial trading 817
staff wish to identify themselves) due to the gen-
erally accepted negative culture toward “whis-
tleblowing” and admitting error in the financial 
trading industry (Atkinson, Jones, & Eduardo, 
2012; Keenan & Krueger, 1992).
Trading staff complete a reporting form, which 
includes a narrative section for eliciting a descrip-
tion of the incident in the staff’s own words and a 
drop-down menu section to elicit contextual 
details about the incident, for example, whether it 
was resolved or ongoing and the departments 
involved. The risk type drop-down menu provides 
a focus on key risks defined by the organization 
and helps to create specific and detailed reporting 
criteria that can evolve over time to meet the 
changing risks of the firm. This design utilized 
observations that the common language provided 
by taxonomies in addition to free-text narratives 
can retain the richness of narrative reports and at 
the same time allow for systematically organizing 
and analyzing the reported data (Macrae, 2016; 
Holden & Karsh, 2007). Figure 1 is a graphic rep-
resentation of the reporting form.
The second part of FINANS is a taxonomical 
system for interpreting incidents and near misses 
in terms of contributory factors. This system 
consists of three parts.
1. Based on incident analysis frameworks in aviation, 
military, and health care (Mitchell, Williamson, & 
Molesworth, 2016; O’Connor, O’Dea, & Melton, 
2007; Wiener, 1993), a framework for codifying 
problems in nontechnical skills was developed. 
Nontechnical skills are the cognitive and social 
skills that complement a worker’s technical skills 
and underpin safe activity in high-risk environ-
ments (Flin et al., 2003). Research has shown their 
importance for managing risk on the trading floor. 
For example, the decision-making strategies of suc-
cessful traders can be understood utilizing theory 
on situation awareness (e.g., information-gathering 
strategies, comprehension of complex market data, 
and course of action) and teamwork (e.g., commu-
nication on trading). The taxonomy was primarily 
based on a systematic review of nontechnical skills 
in financial trading (situation awareness, decision 
making, teamwork, leadership) and their association 
with good and poor trader performance (Leaver & 
Reader, 2015).
2. Drawing on error theory and other incident report-
ing systems (Reason, 1990; Saward & Stanton, 
2015), we collected data on slips and lapses. Slips 
and lapses occur as a failure of execution of the 
intended task, whereby the actions deviate from 
the current intention (Reason, 1995). Slips are 
observed actions and are typically associated with 
attentional failures. Within FINANS, an example 
of this type of error is classified as “fat fingers,” 
whereby, for example, the trader accidently enters 
an extra zero to the pricing of a deal. Lapses, on 
Figure 1. Graphic of the Financial Incident Analysis System (authors’ own rendering).
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the other hand, are associated with more internal 
events (e.g., failures in memory, distraction), and 
they can also influence performance in trading 
(e.g., during high-volume trading, the trader can 
forget to follow procedures, such as recording 
data on a trade).
3. Utilizing the ergonomics literature (Stanton, 
Salmon, & Rafferty, 2013), data on problems 
with human–computer interactions were also 
coded. Human–computer (or human–machine) 
interaction refers to the errors associated with 
the incomplete interpretation of system input and 
outputs as well as the flaws or inadequacies in 
system design that limits the user’s performance 
(Lang, Graesser, & Hemphill, 1991; Newell & 
Card, 1985; Rasmussen & Vicente, 1989). The 
successful interaction of human and computer is 
crucial in high-technology domains, such as trad-
ing, whereby the incorrect interpretation of data 
output (such as risk variation) can lead to traders’ 
taking the wrong position and potentially large 
losses or unwanted risk exposure.
It is notable the taxonomy consists of “cat-
egory” and “element” levels. Categories func-
tion at a relatively generic level (e.g., situation 
awareness), and elements reflect aspects of 
activity specific to the trading floor environment 
that illustrate the categories (Flin, O’Connor, & 
Crichton, 2008). The list of categories and ele-
ments within the first-stage FINANS taxonomy 
is shown in Table 1.
Subject matter experts (SMEs) were involved 
in the development of the taxonomy, and a pre-
liminary pilot (prior to Study 1) was used to deter-
mine whether SMEs agreed with the overall use-
fulness and fitness of the taxonomy to the inci-
dents. For example, feedback from the SMEs led 
to the incorporation of further systems elements. 
To analyze operational incidents reported through 
FINANS, the subsequent procedure was followed. 
On an incident being electronically reported by a 
trading floor employee, a human factors expert 
reviewed the details and short description, and a 
risk type was assigned. Risk types are defined by 
the risk control team and are used for the categori-
zation of the data in the monthly reporting of inci-
dents and can change over time to address the cur-
rent concerns of the organization (e.g., systems 
glitch, data entry error, late confirmation of a 
trade, physical risk leading to force majeure). The 
narrative text describing the incident was then 
analyzed using the FINANS taxonomy in order to 
identify any human factors–related antecedents to 
the incident.
To test and apply FINANS, we report on two 
studies using the system. The purposes of the 
studies were
1. to test the reliability (e.g., interrater reliability) of 
using the FINANS coding taxonomy to classify 
human factors–related problems described within 
operational incidents reported in financial trading 
(Study 1) and
2. to describe the nature and prevalence of human 
factors–related problems underlying operational 
incidents in financial trading (Study 2)
Study 1
In this study we test the reliability and 
usability of the FINANS coding taxonomy 
(Table 1) for classifying human factors–related 
problems described within operational incidents 
reports. Drawing on incidents collected through 
FINANS, we compare whether different coders 
perceive similar issues within an error report 
or incident when applying FINANS. Because 
FINANS is designed to be used by trading staff 
to analyze incidents (i.e., that they need not rely 
on a psychologist), and to reflect the types of 
errors and problems they experience, in the cur-
rent study a group of expert trading staff (N = 
19) applied the coding framework to analyze 20 
incidents. To assess reliability, we examine the 
interrater reliability of coding by trading staff 
for the system as a whole, individual categories, 
and the elements underpinning each category 
(Butterfield, Borgen, Amundson, & Maglio, 
2005). We also examine whether expert par-
ticipants analyzed incidents in a similar fashion 
to human factors experts (through creating a 
“referent” standard) in order to assess whether 
domain experts unfamiliar with human factors 
concepts can use the taxonomy in the manner 
intended (Gillespie & Reader, in press).
Method
To test the reliability of the taxonomical sys-
tem for interpreting incidents that occur on the 
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floor, an expert user group was recruited from 
within the participating organization: a leading 
energy trading firm active in both physical and 
financial commodity markets. Hedging prod-
ucts include forward contracts, swaps, vanilla 
options, over-the-counter and exchange-based 
TAbLe 1: FINANS Taxonomy
Category Associated Elements
Situation awareness •   Attention (distraction, lack of concentration, divided or overly focused 
attention)
•   Gathering information (poorly organized information, not enough 
gathering of information)
•   Interpretation of information (miscomprehension, assumptions based on 
previous experience)
•   Anticipation (i.e., thinking ahead, judging how a situation will develop)
•   Other
Teamwork •   Role and responsibilities (e.g., unclear segregation of roles)
•   Communication and exchanging of information between team members
•   Shared understanding for goals and tasks
•   Coordination of shared activities
•   Solving conflicts (e.g., between team members and teams)
•   Knowledge sharing between teams
•   Other
Decision making •   Defining the problem
•   Cue recognition (e.g., finding and recognizing the cues to the decision)
•   Seeking advice on a decision
•   Noise and distraction (e.g., that reduce capacity to take a decision)
•   Bias and heuristics (e.g., overoptimism, overconfidence)
•   Other
Leadership •   Authority and assertiveness (e.g., taking command of a situation)
•   Listening
•   Prioritization of goals (e.g., team/organizational)
•   Managing workloads and resources
•   Monitoring activity and performance of team members
•   Maintain standards and ensuring procedures are followed
•   Other
Slip/lapse •   “Fat fingers”
•   Procedural (not following a protocol or following a protocol incorrectly)
•   Routinized task (e.g., a loss of concentration)
•   Forgetfulness (forgetting information or how to perform an activity)
•   Memory
•   Distraction
•   Other
Human–computer 
interface
•   Use of the tools (e.g., spreadsheets)
•   Training on the tool
•   System did not detect the error
•   Design of the software and application
•   Maintenance and testing of the tool
•   Other
Note. FINANS = Financial Incident Analysis System.
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transactions, and derivatives and futures con-
tracts. Approximately 37,500 transactions are 
booked with the exchange or over the counter 
annually on a spot (prompt), medium (futures/
forward), or long-term (contract) basis. The 
sample consisted of three trading managers, 
two trading supervisors, and 14 midlevel trad-
ing staff. Using the FINANS taxonomy, the 
user group analyzed 20 incidents selected from 
the incident log. Incidents were selected on the 
following criteria:
1. At least one of the FINANS categories was evi-
dent in the scenario.
2. Each of the teams was represented.
3. The incidents covered frequent and infrequent 
error types.
The scenarios were presented sequentially and 
through the Web-based interface. Participants 
read each scenario and, using an online coding 
form, indicated which FINANS categories and 
subcategories (e.g., elements) were contributory 
to the scenario. In addition, a referent standard 
was developed by two human factors experts, 
who coded the 20 incidents separately and then 
reviewed the incidents again to resolve any dif-
ferences in coding (and to outline a final set of 
codes for each incident).
Prior to coding, participants were given a 1.5-
hr background tutorial on human factors research 
and the concepts underlying the FINANS sys-
tem. Although this tutorial falls below the rec-
ommended training time of 3 hr (O’Connor 
et al., 2002), time constraints in releasing trad-
ing staff from their work during market hours 
(and also asking them to code 20 incidents) 
meant training was limited. To compensate for 
this limitation, the initial training was supple-
mented with a training document distributed to 
each participant detailing human factors defini-
tions and examples of incident analysis. More-
over, the principal study investigator, whom 
questions could be directed to, was present in the 
workplace.
Analysis
The data analysis consisted of comparisons 
between respondents within the user group (to 
test interrater reliability) and between respon-
dents and the referent standard.
We ran the following analyses. First, to exam-
ine the interrater reliability of the referent users 
(e.g., the human factors experts), we applied a 
Cohen’s kappa. Cohen’s kappa coefficient is a 
statistic that measures interrater agreement for 
two raters for qualitative (categorical) items and 
takes into account the agreement that may occur 
by chance (McHugh, 2012). Second, to establish 
interrater reliability among the expert users, we 
applied a Fleiss kappa (Fleiss kappa is applied to 
extract the nominal scale agreement across 
many raters; Fleiss, 1971). We also used this sta-
tistic to examine the interrater reliability between 
the referent ratings and the expert user group. It 
is suggested that kappa results can be interpreted 
as values k ≤ 0 indicating no agreement; 0.01 ≤ k 
≤ 0.20, none to slight; 0.21 ≤ k ≤ 0.40, fair; 0.41 
≤ k ≤ 0.60, moderate; 0.61 ≤ k ≤ 0.80, substan-
tial; and 0.81 ≤ k ≤ 1.00, almost perfect agree-
ment (Fleiss, Cohen, & Everitt, 1969; McHugh, 
2012).
results
First, we examined the reliability of coding 
for the two human factors experts, from which 
the referent standard was generated (k = 0.894).
Second, we examined the reliability of cod-
ing within the expert user group. Overall, we 
found good reliability for applying the FINANS 
taxonomy at the categorical level (k = 0.840). 
However, greater variance was found in the reli-
ability of coding at the element level (k = 0.453). 
This finding is consistent with previous empiri-
cal studies in other high-risk domains (Baker & 
Krokos, 2007; Yule, Flin, Paterson-Brown, 
Maran, & Rowley, 2006). We summarize the 
findings next through considering the categories 
and subcategories of the taxonomy that had low 
versus high reliability.
Low reliability. Consistently low reliability 
was noted across the element subcategories: 
procedural (slip/lapse category), k = 0.400; 
authority (leadership category), k = 0.400; roles 
and responsibilities (teamwork category), k = 
0.400; and anticipation (situation awareness cat-
egory), k = 0.348. Elements that were not able to 
be calculated via the kappa method due to an 
absence of data (e.g., they were never chosen in 
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the coding exercise), were problem definition, 
cue recognition, selecting a course of action, 
noise and distraction (all decision making), use 
of tools (human–machine interface category), 
solving conflicts (teamwork category), prioriti-
zation, monitoring, listening, and managing 
workload and resources (within the leadership 
category).
High reliability. All categories were reliably 
estimated with a range of kappa scores from k = 
1.0 (decision making) to k = 0.8 (slip/lapse). 
Elements were also found to be statistically sig-
nificant, with interrater reliability ranging from 
k = 0.655 (human–machine interface elements) 
to k = 0.859 (teamwork elements). The within-
group elements did not test as reliably across all 
elements within the cases. The highly reliable 
elements are gathering information, k = 0.8 (sit-
uation awareness); system design, k = 1.0; main-
tenance of the system, k = 0.696; training of the 
tool, k = 0.696; detection of the tool, k = 0.696 
(human–machine interface); knowledge shar-
ing, k = 1.0; communication, k = 1.0; coordina-
tion, k = 0.769; shared understanding, k = 1.0 
(teamwork); maintaining standards and proce-
dures (leadership), k = 0.65; fat fingers, k = 
0.783; forgetfulness, k = 0.737; and routine task 
k = 1.0 (slip/lapse category).
Overall, high reliability was observed for the 
category and elements within the teamwork, 
slip/lapse, situation awareness, and human–
machine interface skill sets. Lower reliability 
was observed for the leadership and decision-
making categories.
Finally, the kappa agreement when analyzing 
the reliability between the reference ratings (n = 
2) and the expert ratings (n = 19) for each 
FINANS category was good (k = 0.871).
discussion
This study was designed to test the reli-
ability of the FINANS taxonomy for codifying 
incident reports in the financial trading domain. 
Given the limitations in training, the results are 
encouraging and suggest that the human fac-
tors problems underlying error in the financial 
domain can be reliably identified and extracted 
by trained experts in financial trading. In estab-
lishing statistically significant reliability, we 
can confirm that experts generally agree on the 
human factors problems underlying operational 
incidents in financial trading and that the frame 
of reference held by these experts can be vali-
dated (Leeds & Griffith, 2001). This finding is 
important for demonstrating the appropriateness 
of FINANS for analyzing operational incidents 
within financial trading (i.e., it fits to the needs 
of the domain and its users) and indicates it 
can be administered with light-touch support. 
Most crucially, FINANS provides a reliable tool 
through which to examine the role and extent 
of human factors–related problems underlying 
operational incidents in financial trading. This 
tool has the potential to provide data crucial 
for identifying, understanding, and ameliorat-
ing risk within financial trading organizations. 
Yet, as indicated in the results, some of the 
categories and subcategories within FINANS 
tend either to not be used reliably (e.g., the pro-
cedural element within slip/lapse category) or to 
be used very minimally. This finding indicates 
FINANS requires further refinement, and we 
examine this issue further in study 2.
Study 2
In Study 2 we examine the nature and 
prevalence of human factors–related problems 
underlying operational incidents in financial 
trading. We refer to the incidents as “opera-
tional” to remain consistent with terminology 
in the financial domain used to describe error 
reporting and investigation. At present, rela-
tively little is known about the types of human 
factors–related incidents that occur in financial 
trading or, indeed, the number of incidents that 
occur relative to total transactions. This finding 
compares poorly to other domains, for example, 
aviation, where the number of incidents and 
fatalities in relation to the number of flights 
per year is systematically documented (Boeing, 
2014). We used FINANS to collect and analyze 
operational incidents in a large financial trading 
company over a period of 2 years. The analysis 
was conducted with four principle aims: (a) to 
provide data on the number of trades that lead 
to an incident, (b) to identify the distribution of 
human factors problems within the cases, (c) 
to provide evidence on the outcomes of these 
human factors problems, and (d) to explore the 
co-occurrence of human factors codes in the 
 at London School of Economics & Political Sciences on August 30, 2016hfs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
822 September 2016 - Human Factors
data set (i.e., clusters of problems that occur 
together). In addition to these aims, we utilized 
the larger data set to further refine the FINANS 
taxonomy.
Method
FINANS was used to collect incident reports 
in the participating organization over a period of 
2 years (from January 2013 until January 2015). 
Prior to study commencement, and with the sup-
port of the organization, trading floor staff were 
given presentations of the incident collection 
log as well as practice entries and demonstra-
tions by a human factors expert (separate to 
the reliability study, although all participants 
in the reliability study were present during the 
briefings). Presentations and demonstrations 
were approximately 1 hr in duration (given 
four times due to turnover in teams and “matur-
ing” incident reports). Following each reporting 
month, a trained human factors expert provided 
feedback reports (e.g., histogram and patterns 
of events by risk type, deconstructed complex 
events, incidents, and solutions for four to five 
logged incidents from the month of reporting) 
to the participating staff and management. Over 
this period, approximately 750 unique incident 
reports (i.e., each incident reporting on a prob-
lematic trade was different) were collected and 
deemed suitable for analysis (e.g., clear text).
Of the 750 incidents, the lead author coded all 
the cases; a further 375 (50%) cases were coded 
by the second author to provide a reliability assess-
ment for coding. These cases were randomly 
selected from the batch. The coding process was 
made up of 8 steps: (1) identification of the inci-
dent type (e.g., slip, mistake, violation), (2) selec-
tion of the relevant human factors category (e.g., 
situation awareness, decision making, teamwork, 
leadership, human–computer interface, or slip/
lapse), (3) the selection of the relevant subcate-
gory (e.g., element) of nontechnical skills (e.g., if 
situation awareness is chosen as a main category, 
the element[s] can be selected from distraction, 
gathering information, interpreting information, 
and anticipation of future states), (4) identification 
of single team or multiple team, (5) identification 
of an ongoing state or isolated nature of the inci-
dent, (6) reporting whether the incident was a near 
miss or a failure, (7) identification of the trigger of 
the incident (e.g., a text box entry), and (8) filling 
in the blanks in the following sentence: “The main 
cause of the issue is [blank], and is caused by 
[blank].”
Analysis
Descriptive analysis. First, we calculated the 
number of erroneous trades identified by the 
system in relation to the total number of trades 
within the organization. Second, we used 
Cohen’s kappa to calculate the reliability of the 
second coder against the first coder for 375 
cases. Third, we described the distribution of 
human factors problems using frequency and 
mean calculations for the categories and ele-
ments with FINANS, including category and 
elements that are not reliably coded or not coded 
for in the n = 750 cases.
Serious incident analysis. Next, we adopted a 
pathway analysis within SPSS to determine 
whether the incidents classified as near miss or 
failure had a common set of human factors ante-
cedents. Pathway analyses describe all the varia-
tions of the coded data and then are used to predict 
whether some codes or sets of codes significantly 
predict an outcome (e.g., financial loss).
Associative analysis. Third, through bivariate 
correlation and backward likelihood ratios, we 
conducted an associative analysis to examine 
co-occurrence of FINANS category codes 
within incident reports (e.g., to establish whether 
there are certain patterns of codes that occur 
together). The importance of investigating the 
co-occurrence of codes was revealed when we 
observed how the data were repeatedly coded 
for multiple human factors codes, and thus this 
part of the investigation is exploratory.
results
Descriptive analysis. Financial trading staff 
reported 750 incident reports through FINANS. 
This number equates to 1.08% of transactions 
within the company. Across the total data set, 70% 
of incidents were a near miss (an error did occur 
but was detected and fixed by system controls), 
and the majority of incidents (90%) involved 
activity distributed across more than one team.
Of the incidents coded by both the lead author 
and second author (n = 375), good overall 
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reliability was found using Cohen’s kappa (k = 
0.78). All incidents had at least one code from 
the FINANS taxonomy applied to explain the 
incident (e.g., incidents can be coded as multiple 
categories and elements). At the category level, 
the reliability was generally good, with the 
exception of decision making. Substantial reli-
ability was determined for leadership (k = 0.83), 
teamwork (k = 0.79), slip/lapse (k = 0.72), situa-
tion awareness (k = 0.72), and human–computer 
interface (k = 0.67). Moderate reliability was 
determined for decision making (k = 0.49). Ele-
ments were also coded for each case. At the ele-
ment level, the reliability was disparate, ranging 
from good to poor or not applicable. High-reli-
ability elements included maintenance and test-
ing (k = 0.77; human–computer interface cate-
gory), roles and responsibilities (k = 0.62; team-
work category), and maintaining standards (k = 
0.65; leadership category). Acceptable-reliabil-
ity elements included attention (k = 0.57; situa-
tion awareness) and communication (k = 0.48; 
teamwork). Similar to Study 1, several elements 
were never or rarely coded, which led to poor 
reliability (k < 0.4). These elements included 
bias and heuristics, listening, goal prioritization, 
managing workload, monitoring activity, mem-
ory, and training; and many elements were coded 
interchangeably, which led to poor reliability. 
The implications are explored in the discussion.
In terms of applying FINANS taxonomy to 
the incidents, Table 2 provides a fine-grained 
analysis of the frequency and percentage for 
each human factors category and element used 
to classify human errors. To illustrate the context 
of data collection (and the potential for interven-
tion), and the types of problems being codified 
using the FINANS taxonomy, qualitative exam-
ples are included within Table 2.
Table 2 shows that over half of incidents 
involve a slip/lapse or situation awareness prob-
lem. Within these subcategories, the most com-
mon elements were fat fingers (40%) and attention 
(56%). Teamwork problems were identified in 
40% of incidents, with coordination being the 
most commonly coded element (30%). The least 
coded category was decision making (3.6%). In 
terms of elements, the most commonly coded was 
attention (213), followed by fat fingers (185) and 
coordination (87). Again, some elements were 
never coded; these included noise, seeking advice 
on a decision, and the prioritization of goals. Sim-
ilarly, some elements were rarely coded, such as 
authority and assertiveness, problem definition, 
software design, and manage workload. Further-
more, elements within more commonly applied 
categories (e.g., distraction within the slip/lapse 
category) were also rarely used.
In terms of refining FINANS for future use, a 
number of observations might be made. Table 1 
indicates a number of rarely occurring elements 
(e.g., training in human–computer interaction, 
authority and assertiveness in leadership). This 
finding is consistent with the data in Study 1, and 
these elements might be removed or amalgamated 
with other elements (e.g., use of tools, maintaining 
standards) in future iterations of FINANS. Fur-
thermore, the larger reliability exercise conducted 
for Study 2 indicates some subcategories to dem-
onstrate low reliability as they are used inter-
changeably, in particular, fat fingers and routine 
task, and forgetfulness and attention (within slip/
lapse). In order to strengthen the reliability of the 
tool, the data indicate that these codes might also 
be combined. Last, although the literature search 
that informed the taxonomy used in this study 
does not include stress management, there is a 
likely benefit in studying the influence of stress 
and fatigue upon trading staff performance. For 
example, research shows that traders are less 
likely to make use of stress coping strategies 
despite stress resistance being identified as a char-
acteristic of good traders.
Serious incident analysis. In the next analysis 
we investigated whether the incidents had a 
common set of antecedents. In the coding frame-
work, incident outcomes were coded as a near 
miss or failure, and we focused on the distinc-
tion between these incidents. Specifically, we 
assessed whether there were particular human 
factors issues leading to near misses (system 
controls detected and corrected the error) or 
actual failure (systems controls failed to detect 
the error). For example, the data collected 
through FINANS indicate that errors that typi-
cally originate in the front office may pass 
through the “layers of defense” in the middle 
office and then are either detected at the tertiary 
cross-check by the back office team (leading to 
a near miss) or left undetected.
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TAbLe 2: Financial Trading Human Factors Taxonomy Descriptions and Frequency
Category and  
Element Skill Description
Example of 
 an Incident
Element Coding 
Frequency When the 
Category Is Coded
Situation awareness  
 Anticipation Comprehending the 
situation, understanding 
what might happen next
Downloading deals with 
incorrect volume units, 
leading to incorrect 
current risk projection
57 (15%)
 Attention Maintaining concentration 
and avoiding distraction
Inverting the price and 
volume of the trade in the 
system
213 (56%)
 Gathering info Perception of the elements 
in the current situation 
(e.g., visual information, 
screens, auditory 
information)
Volumes in the system not 
matching the physical 
deal sheet
84 (22%)
 Interpreting info Processing the current 
information to make sense 
of the current situation in 
order to understand what 
is going on (involves the 
interpretation of various 
cues)
Hedging a flat position 
due to inaccurate 
interpretation of 
information in the system
28 (7%)
 Total 382 (51%)
Teamwork  
 Communication Exchange of information, 
feedback or response, 
ideas and feelings
A change in contractual specs 
poorly communicated 
between the teams
53 (18%)
 Coordination Coordination within and 
between teams, improved 
by equal distribution of 
task work, monitoring 
each other, and effective 
exchange of information
Two members of the same 
team duplicating the data 
entry during work flow
87 (30%)
  Roles and  
 responsibilities
Lack of adherence to 
clearly and appropriately 
segregated roles
Weak definition of business 
rules in the system 
leads to the incorrect 
assignment of access
75 (26%)
 Shared understanding Knowledge held by 
members of a team that 
enable them to form 
accurate explanations 
and expectations for the 
task, to coordinate their 
actions, and to adapt their 
behaviors accordingly
Validating an erroneous 
buy trade when the desk 
wants to short a product
78 (27%)
 Total 293 (40%)
(continued)
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Category and  
Element Skill Description
Example of 
 an Incident
Element Coding 
Frequency When the 
Category Is Coded
Decision making  
 Bias and heuristics Simple rule people use 
to form judgments 
and make decisions 
(e.g., availability, 
representativeness, 
anchoring and 
adjustment, affect)
Undervaluing the 
information provided in a 
credit risk report
17 (63%)
 Cue recognition The primary situation 
assessment (e.g., 
what is the problem) 
through the recognition 
and interpretation of 
environmental cues
Currency units not equal 
to geographical trade 
location
7 (26%)
 Problem definition Decision-making method 
(e.g., what should I do)
Recognizing the input value 
is incorrect, using the 
closest settle price as a 
placeholder until the true 
value could be determined
3 (11%)
 Total 27 (3.6%)
Leadership  
  Authority and  
 assertiveness
Ability to create a proper 
challenge and response 
atmosphere by balancing 
assertiveness and team 
member participation and 
being prepared to take 
decisive action
Failing to generate a timely 
risk assessment and 
assignment of trading 
limits of a new trading 
instrument
2 (2%)
 Maintaining standards Compliance with essential 
standards (e.g., operating 
procedures)
Not entering trades on the 
transaction date
64 (62%)
 Manage workload Understanding the basic 
contributors to workload 
and developing the skills 
of organizing task sharing 
to avoid workload peaks 
and dips
Mismanaging staffing 
schedules, leading to task 
overload during end-of-
month procedures
9 (8%)
 Monitor activity Maintain team focus and 
monitor the output of the 
team
Underutilizing the daily 
reports to cross-check 
trading limit breach levels 
(e.g., 80%) with activity 
forecasts
29 (28%)
 Total 104 (14%)
TAbLe 2: (continued)
(continued)
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Category and  
Element Skill Description
Example of 
 an Incident
Element Coding 
Frequency When the 
Category Is Coded
Slip/lapse  
 Distraction Avoiding the prevention of 
concentration
Entering the wrong affair for 
a number of trades
39 (9%)
 “Fat fingers” The mistyping or mis-entry 
of data information
Entering an extra digit on 
the price (e.g., 0.01 vs. 
0.1)
185 (40%)
 Forgetfulness A lapse of memory Updating contractual 
quantities without 
amending price details
51 (11%)
 Memory The faculty by which 
the mind stores and 
remembers information
Skipping a step in the 
procedure
27 (6%)
 Procedure An established or official 
way of doing things 
(written or oral)
The fitness of the 
procedures to the task 
(e.g., adaptation to 
new changing product 
definitions)
83 (18%)
 Routine task Task work that is 
commonplace or must 
be completed at regular 
intervals (e.g., data input)
Adherence to daily 
procedural tasks (e.g., 
time stamp on all deals)
74 (16%)
 Total 459 (61%)
Human–computer 
interaction
 
  Maintenance and  
 testing
The system is tested 
regularly and adaptations 
are timely to reflect the 
task work
Multiple downloads of 
electronic platform 
transactions by the broker
52 (31%)
 Software design The design of the software 
does not inhibit task work 
(e.g., low complexity, 
interface-friendly)
Transactions for Product A 
entered on the market for 
valuation of Product B
9 (5%)
 System detection The system controls work 
properly
System fails to send out 
timely and accurate 
breach reports
40 (24%)
 Training The team members 
involved in the task have 
sufficient experience and 
training
Team member lacks the 
ability to cross-check data 
output from the system 
with confidence
32 (19%)
 Use of tools The team members can 
navigate the system with 
proficiency
Ability to enter a new 
product transaction in the 
system independently and 
model the risk
37 (22%)
 Total 170 (23%)
TAbLe 2: (continued)
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This finding indicates that particular aspects 
of team coordination lead to actual losses, and to 
ascertain whether a distinct pattern of contribu-
tory factors was underlying near misses or fail-
ures, we applied a pathway analysis to the data 
set in SPSS. This pathway analysis describes all 
the variations of the coded data and then is used 
to predict whether some codes or sets of codes 
significantly predict an outcome. Figure 2 illus-
trates the relationship between the human fac-
tors categories and how they are related to the 
outcomes (e.g., near miss or failure).
Figure 2 reveals two significant relationships 
as a function of outcome (e.g., near miss or fail-
ure). First, the interaction between situation 
awareness and teamwork most often predicts a 
failure outcome, and second, coding for slip/
lapse alone commonly results in a near-miss out-
come (indicating it is noticed and prevented by 
other trading staff). For the most serious inci-
dents, situation awareness and teamwork factors 
are most commonly attributed to these out-
comes. This observation led us to conduct an 
exploratory analysis into the particular patterns 
of categories within FINANS that occur together 
within incidents.
Associative analysis. Spearman correlation 
coefficient is used to achieve the bivariate cor-
relation between the (noncontinuous) variables 
(Hauke & Kossowski, 2011), and we used this 
statistic to examine the associations between 
FINANS categories applied to the incident data. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 
3. This analysis reveals patterns of association 
Figure 2. Sets of human factors that lead to near miss or failure in operational trading incidents. 
SA = situation awareness; TMWK = teamwork; DM = decision making; LDSHP = leadership; 
SL = slip/lapse; HCI = human–computer interaction.
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or lack of association between certain catego-
ries, and we consider the findings next.
Codes that occur together. The strongest posi-
tive correlation was found between teamwork and 
situation awareness. This correlation means that 
when an event is coded for teamwork, it is signifi-
cantly likely that situation awareness will also be 
coded for (and vice versa). This finding indicates 
that when breakdowns in teamwork occur, it is 
likely that a breakdown in situation awareness has 
also occurred. This coupling occurs significantly 
within the data set, indicating its presence to 
increase the likelihood for error in the trading 
domain. This finding is consistent with previous 
research in the trading domain showing under-
standing and sharing insight into risk is under-
pinned by the distribution of cognition and 
understanding across teams—often termed “team 
situation awareness” (Endsley & Jones, 2013; 
Leaver & Reader, 2015; Michel, 2007). The sec-
ond most common association was between team-
work and leadership. This close association is 
unsurprising, given the current evidence that lead-
ership behaviors in the trading domain are deter-
mined by situational factors (e.g., incoming team 
revenue) and that monitoring fluctuates according 
to team performance (Willman et al., 2002; Will-
man, O’Creevy, Nicholson, & Soane, 2001).
Codes that do not occur together. There are 
two striking non-associations that emerge from 
the data set. First, slip/lapse is significantly likely 
to occur alone than with any other category of 
human factors, and the strongest opposition is 
with teamwork. This finding exemplifies the 
nature of slip/lapse incidents, which are typi-
cally easily detectable by the many layers of 
TAbLe 3: Bivariate Correlation of Incidents (n = 750)
SA TMWK DM LDSHP SL HCI
SA  
 Correlation coefficient 1.000  
 Significance (two tailed) .  
 n 750.000  
TMWK  
 Correlation coefficient .370 1.000  
 Significance (two tailed) .000 .  
 n 750.000 750.000  
DM  
 Correlation coefficient .061 .080 1.000  
 Significance (two tailed) .096 .029 .  
 n 750.000 750.000 750.000  
LDSHP  
 Correlation coefficient .131 .288 .171 1.000  
 Significance (two tailed) .000 .000 .000 .  
 n .000 750.000 750.000 750.000  
SL  
 Correlation coefficient −.179 −.445 −.184 −.322 1.000  
 Significance (two tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .  
 n 750.000 750.000 750.000 750.000 750.000  
HCI  
 Correlation coefficient −.072 −.071 −.013 −.102 −.344 1.000
 Significance (two tailed) .049 .053 .725 .005 .000 .
 n 750.000 750.000 750.000 750.000 750.000 750.000
Note. SA = situation awareness; TMWK = teamwork; DM = decision making; LDSHP = leadership; SL = slip/lapse; 
HCI = human–computer interaction.
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defense built into the system and typically low 
complexity (e.g., characterized by a fat-fingers 
incident). The second observation from the data 
set is that human–computer interaction also 
occurs alone more often than with other catego-
ries. This finding indicates that when faults in the 
operating system or equipment occur, they are 
detected and reported before elevating in com-
plexity (e.g., interrupting team processes). Incon-
sistent with the literature on human–computer 
interaction, an association between situation 
awareness and human–computer interaction was 
not observed (Weyers, Burkolter, Kluge, & 
Luther, 2010).
discussion
Study 2 revealed approximately 1% of finan-
cial trades annually to incur some form of error. 
This figure is likely a conservative estimate due 
to potential underreporting and is less than in 
domains such as health care but greater than in 
aviation (Boeing, 2014; de Vries, Ramrattan, 
Smorenburg, Gouma, & Boermeester, 2008). 
Consistent with the notion of financial trading 
as a high-risk industry, FINANS provides a 
practical tool for identifying and understanding 
the causes of error. In regards to generalizability 
to other financial organizations, the research 
was conducted on a large commodity-trading 
floor, with generally analogous features (per-
sonnel, systems, and organizational design) to 
other trading organizations (e.g., banks). Yet 
this generalizability requires examination, and 
FINANS should be used, albeit cautiously, to 
inform the development of incident analysis in 
similar trading floor environments.
In terms of the human factors problems 
underlying critical incidents in financial trading, 
slip/lapse-related errors (e.g., fat fingers) was 
the most frequently coded category, occurred 
often in isolation from other human factors 
problems (e.g., teamwork), and were more likely 
to be associated with near-miss outcomes (indi-
cating errors were being caught by trading staff). 
It is perhaps not surprising that slip/lapse errors 
are more likely to be reported in the operational 
incident log than others (e.g., decision-making 
skills), as they are relatively easy to detect retro-
spectively, and participants may show a bias for 
reporting less punitive, easily detected events 
(e.g., fat fingers, following procedures) than 
complex, punitive issues (e.g., failing to consider 
options). In general, slip/lapse problems did not 
lead to serious incidents, as they were often fixed 
quickly through organizational procedures (e.g., 
team cross-checks), and this finding has also 
been observed in industries such as aviation 
(Vincent & Amalberti, 2016, Chapter 5).
In addition, we observed that a significant 
proportion of critical errors originated from fail-
ings in situation awareness and teamwork pro-
cesses. This finding may indicate team-based 
processes, such as communication and coordi-
nation (e.g., cross-checking of information, 
monitoring of information), to influence team 
situation awareness on the trading floor and reso-
nates with research in health care and aviation 
(Jentsch, Barnett, Bowers, & Salas, 1999; Reader, 
Flin, Mearns, & Cuthbertson, 2011). Thus, future 
research may focus on how teamwork and situa-
tion awareness interact to influence performance 
on the trading floor, for example, how errors 
migrate and develop on the trading floor (e.g., 
typical error migration is from the front office, 
through the middle office, to the back office) and 
awareness of interdependencies among team 
members.
Relatively few incidents were reported as hav-
ing leadership or decision-making problems, and 
this finding is contrary to experimental work in the 
finance domain. The analysis presented in this 
two-phase study reveals that decision making is 
a less present indicator of team performance in 
the trading domain, and this finding may reflect 
limitations in the abilities of trading staff to self-
monitor decision-making activities. Also, the 
absence of decision making may indicate that inci-
dent reporting may not be an optimal way to col-
lect data on decision making in financial trading, 
and other forms of study (e.g., observations) may 
be more useful. In terms of leadership, this cate-
gory might be conceptualized as a more “distal” 
cause of incidents (e.g., setting and maintaining 
standards) and perhaps more difficult to isolate as 
a contributory factor to incidents.
Finally, the findings of this study might lend 
themselves to develop interventions and inform 
regulators on the causes of problems in risk man-
agement in financial trading, for example, in terms 
of training programs (e.g., on interdependencies 
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between teams), software design, and changes to 
systems and procedures.
Study LIMItAtIonS
The results are constrained by the nature 
of the incident reporting, which is susceptible 
to underreporting and incomplete information 
about incidents (O’Connor et al., 2007). Inci-
dent reporting in trading is limited by the need 
for an individual to be aware that the event has 
occurred, his or her limited perspective on the 
incident, and his or her motivation to report. 
Furthermore, for Study 1, experts undertook 
a relatively short training exercise, potentially 
affecting their ability to accurately code inci-
dents—in the future, it is suggested a longer 
training exercise is utilized. For Study 2, a fur-
ther limitation was that only one coder analyzed 
the incidents (with a second coding half of the 
incidents to assess for interrater reliability), 
and the data analysis was constrained by the 
clarity of the text and the potential biases of 
trading staff in recalling the incident. Finally, 
the FINANS taxonomy may require further 
development. Issues such as stress, fatigue, 
and organizational culture were not examined, 
and the reliability analysis indicated scope for 
improving the FINANS taxonomy (which will 
be the focus of future work).
concLudIng reMArkS
This study reports the first system for captur-
ing operational incidents on the trading floor 
and analyzing the human factors–related issues 
that led to them. Through two studies, we found 
that experts in the trading domain can reliably 
and accurately code human factors underly-
ing in incidents in financial trading and that 
approximately 1% of all trades incur error. 
Although slip/lapse is the most common factor 
underlying incidents, problems in teamwork 
and situation awareness underpin the most criti-
cal incidents. In order to develop a more fine-
grained analysis of the nature of these errors, 
authors of future research should aim to further 
improve FINANS and to identify the specific 
skills and conditions that lead to effective risk 
management on the trading floor.
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key PoIntS
 • Human factors problems underlying error in the 
financial domain can be reliably identified and 
extracted by trained experts in financial trading 
using the Financial Incident Analysis System 
(FINANS).
 • FINANS is both appropriate for analyzing opera-
tional incidents within financial trading (i.e., it fits 
to the needs of the domain and its users) and can 
be administered in financial trading organizations 
without the assistance of psychologists to monitor 
and analyze data.
 • FINANS provides a reliable tool through which 
to examine the role and extent of human factors–
related problems underlying operational incidents 
in financial trading. This tool has the potential to 
provide data crucial for identifying, understand-
ing, and ameliorating risk within financial trading 
organizations.
 • Approximately 1% of trades incur some form of 
error per year, which provides a useful benchmark 
for financial organizations against other high-risk 
industries.
 • A significant proportion of the underlying causes 
of the most critical errors originates from failings 
in situation awareness and teamwork processes. In 
particular, we find a significant likelihood of team-
work and situation awareness to occur together 
and lead to critical outcomes (e.g., loss events).
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